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influence on the exchange rate. We do this over the entire post-float period, as well 
as for each of the three distinct cycles in the exchange rate during that period. The 
premise underlying the profit test is that if the central bank has made a profit from 
intervention in its currency, it must have ‘bought low and sold high’, which would 
work towards stabilising the exchange rate. Since the float, the RBA has made a 
profit of A$5.2 billion on its intervention operations, with profits made in each of 
the three cycles. The paper concludes that the profitability of intervention suggests 
that the RBA’s operations have had a stabilising influence on the exchange rate. 
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ii PROFITABILITY OF RESERVE BANK FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
OPERATIONS: TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE FLOAT 
Chris Becker and Michael Sinclair 
1.  Introduction 
When the Australian dollar was floated over 20 years ago, the Australian 
Government and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) gave up the determination 
of the exchange rate to market forces. However, while allowing the exchange rate 
to move freely in a wide range, the RBA retained the discretion to intervene in the 
foreign exchange market from time to time if conditions warranted. 
Have the RBA’s efforts to stabilise the exchange rate through intervention 
achieved the desired outcome? 
As the counterfactual exchange rate path in the absence of intervention is 
unobservable, we invoke an indirect test of the effectiveness of intervention. The 
basic thesis postulated is that intervention aimed at stabilising the exchange rate 
will require the central bank to buy the currency when the exchange rate is 
relatively low and to sell it when the exchange rate is high. Such a policy, if 
pursued successfully, will generate a trading profit as a by-product. Applying this 
logic in reverse, it follows that if a central bank has generated profits from its 
intervention, it must have bought low and sold high, which would work to stabilise 
the exchange rate. This approach, first applied to Australia by Andrew and 
Broadbent (1994) derives from the work of Milton Friedman who, in his 1953 
book, argued that currency speculators would, on balance, be stabilising as they 
would not survive if they did not buy low and sell high. 
We find that the RBA has made a profit of A$5.2 billion from intervention since 
the float. We identify three distinct cycles in the exchange rate and in the 
intervention activities of the RBA, and find that intervention has been profitable, 
not only over the entire post-float period, but also in each of the three cycles. We 
conclude from these findings that the RBA’s transactions have helped to stabilise 
the currency.   2
The paper is organised in the following sequence. Section 2 gives a brief account 
of why the RBA retains the discretion to intervene in the foreign exchange market. 
Section 3 gives a technical account of how intervention is conducted. Section 4 
details how intervention has evolved since the time of the float. Section 5 lays out 
the calculation of profits from intervention. The final section offers some 
concluding remarks. The Appendix provides a survey of studies of Australian 
intervention. 
2.  Why the Reserve Bank Intervenes 
The decision to float the Australian dollar allowed market forces to determine the 
value of the currency. Since the float, the exchange rate has moved freely in a wide 
range around an average of US70½ cents, peaking at US96½ cents in March 1984 
and reaching a low of just under US48 cents in April 2001. The adoption of a 
floating exchange rate regime, however, did not mean that the RBA had become 
indifferent to either the level of, or movement in, the exchange rate, since these can 
have a powerful influence on important aspects of the economy, particularly 
economic growth and inflation. As such, the RBA has from time to time intervened 
in the foreign exchange market. 
This approach had its roots in the findings of the Campbell Committee which 
concluded that an absolutely ‘clean’ float was unrealistic and acknowledged that 
the authorities might wish to deal in the market from time to time, while at the 
same time cautioning against exchange rate targeting. There was also a widespread 
expectation in financial markets that the RBA would intervene, as suggested by an 
Australian Financial Review (AFR) headline on the first trading day of the float 
entitled, ‘The question now is when and how to intervene’ (12 December 1983, 
p 5). 
It is interesting to note that the academic literature over the past couple of decades 
has come to acknowledge that financial markets can overshoot. There is extensive 
literature, for example, on speculative bubbles, herding, fads and other behaviour 
which can drive market prices away from their equilibrium values, even in a 
market which is deep and liquid. When such overshooting occurs, intervention may 
help in limiting the move or returning the exchange rate towards its equilibrium 
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level, thus obviating the need for costly adjustment by the real economy to the 
incorrect signals which the exchange rate would otherwise give. 
The RBA’s approach to intervention has evolved over the past 20 years. The 
various phases in its approach to intervention are outlined below, but in broad 
terms there has been a shift away from concern about short-term volatility in the 
early days following the float to a focus on episodes where the exchange rate has 
‘overshot’ – i.e. moved to a level that does not seem reasonable in the context of a 
range of economic and financial developments. Broadly, this change in emphasis 
has resulted in intervention strategy moving from small daily interventions with 
frequent changes in direction (often described as ‘testing and smoothing’) to less 
frequent but larger scale intervention once the exchange rate had moved a long 
way. 
Of course, the important issue is to identify in practice when the exchange rate has 
in fact overshot. Typically, the RBA has come to regard overshooting as unlikely 
to be occurring unless the exchange rate has moved a long way and, as noted, the 
move does not appear to be supported by economic and financial factors. This 
approach effectively means that the bulk of the RBA’s intervention takes place 
around the cyclical highs and lows in the exchange rate. 
In addition to circumstances where there appears to be misalignment, the RBA will 
also consider intervening in the market when conditions threaten to become 
disorderly. Persistent volatility, a sharp widening in bid-ask spreads or erratic 
movements of the exchange rate (especially at times of uncertainty about 
macroeconomic policy) may result in intervention to help restore order. Having 
said this, the RBA has become more comfortable with the ability of the market to 
cope with shocks of various types, so episodes when intervention is motivated by 
the desire to avoid disorderly conditions have become much less frequent. 
Neither of the two reasons for intervention discussed above suggests that 
intervention could be used as an effective instrument of policy for achieving a 
particular level for the exchange rate. Nor does it imply the use of intervention to 
correct a monetary policy imbalance or to resist changes in the exchange rate 
which are in line with broader economic or financial developments. 
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In addition to intervention (i.e. transactions aimed purely at influencing the 
exchange rate) the RBA also undertakes more routine operations in the foreign 
exchange market, such as covering Government foreign exchange needs and 
rebuilding reserve holdings after periods of intervention. These give the RBA a 
fairly regular presence in the foreign exchange market. 
3.  How the Reserve Bank Intervenes 
When the RBA intervenes, it buys or sells Australian dollars against another 
currency, almost always the US dollar.1 To support the exchange rate at a time 
when it is depreciating, the RBA would sell foreign exchange and buy Australian 
dollars. If the RBA wanted to resist an appreciating exchange rate, it would buy 
foreign exchange and sell Australian dollars. The RBA has the capacity to deal in 
Australian dollars around the world, 24 hours a day. 
As well as decisions about whether, and by how much, to intervene, the RBA also 
has discretion to vary the way the intervention is conducted and therefore the 
impact a given amount of intervention will have on the market. The most low-key 
form of intervention is to use an agent bank, so that the market as a whole is not 
aware of the RBA’s presence. This type of transaction is also typically used when 
the RBA is replenishing reserves after a period of intervention, as the aim is to 
rebuild reserve holdings without having a significant impact on the market. In 
these operations, the RBA leaves orders with commercial banks and acts as a price 
taker rather than trying directly to push the exchange rate one way or another. 
A second type of intervention involves the RBA entering the broker market 
directly, either through voice brokers or, in recent years, the electronic broker 
market. Within this broad strategy, the RBA can vary the intensity of its operations 
by either dealing on other banks’ bids or offers or, if it wants to be more 
aggressive, bidding or offering directly. Because the broker market is the main 
mechanism used by interbank market participants to trade among themselves, 
                                           
1  It will usually subsequently re-balance the various currencies it holds in order to restore the 
proportions in line with its foreign currency benchmark. For example, a sale of US dollars for 
Australian dollars will require a subsequent round of transactions to sell some euros and yen 
(the two other foreign currencies held) and buy US dollars so that the proportions of each 
currency held are restored to benchmark. 
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knowledge of the RBA’s presence in the market is immediately available to all 
active interbank players. They typically also inform their clients very quickly. This 
‘announcement effect’ can itself have a significant impact on the exchange rate. 
A third form of intervention is to bypass the broker market and deal directly with 
banks. Such operations involve the RBA phoning banks quoting in the Australian 
dollar market for two-way prices in the exchange rate. If the RBA deals on a 
bank’s bid or offer, that bank would be left with an open position which it would 
need to cover. This is risky for the bank concerned, as the RBA will be dealing on 
other banks’ bids or offers, so a number of banks may be faced with the same 
position which they need to cover. To try to limit their potential exposures, banks 
receiving a call from the RBA will shift their exchange rate quotes to make them 
financially less attractive to the RBA, but in the process pushing the exchange rate 
in the direction the RBA desires for policy reasons. For example, during a period 
of exchange rate weakness, when the RBA is buying Australian dollars, a bank 
quoting a rate to the RBA would increase its offer price, thus causing the exchange 
rate to rise. 
If the RBA deals on the offer, the bank selling would need to enter the interbank 
market to buy Australian dollars in order to cover its short position. This sets in 
train a second round of upward pressure on the exchange rate. The process of 
churning in the interbank market continues until the exchange rate has risen to a 
point that it entices a new seller of Australian dollars to enter the market. This form 
of intervention tends to have the largest impact on the exchange rate for any given 
transaction size. The RBA can of course use several different types of intervention 
simultaneously, say, asking banks for prices while bidding in the electronic broker 
market. 
As well as undertaking transactions directly with the market, the RBA can use its 
transactions with the Australian Government to have an impact on the exchange 
rate. Normally, the RBA covers foreign exchange sold to the Government by 
buying in the market, so there is no net effect on its reserve holdings, apart from 
possible short-term timing mismatches. However, if the exchange rate is relatively 
low, the RBA may choose to meet the Government’s foreign exchange needs 
directly from its reserve holdings. In effect, selling reserves to the Government can 
be thought of as a form of intervention in that it has a similar effect on the 
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exchange rate as intervention done in a low-key way in the market using agents. 
Normally, as the exchange rate is falling the RBA would stop buying foreign 
exchange in the market to cover Government transactions well before any direct 
intervention operations. 
On rare occasions, such as in September 1998, the RBA has broadened its 
intervention to include buying call options on the Australian dollar. The buying of 
call options gives the RBA an additional element of flexibility in its intervention 
strategy, allowing it to stimulate significant demand for Australian dollars for a 
given outlay in options premiums. This demand is, of course, limited to the term of 
the option, but can still be useful in maintaining foreign exchange market stability 
during short-lived turbulence. 
3.1  Sterilisation of Intervention 
Intervention operations have implications for domestic liquidity. When the RBA 
buys Australian dollars, for example, there is a fall in the banking system’s 
holdings of Australian dollars, thereby draining cash from the domestic money 
market. If the RBA took no further action, the market would be short of cash and 
domestic money market interest rates would tend to rise. This would be an 
example of unsterilised intervention. In effect, it would be a tightening of monetary 
policy since it leads to a rise in the cash rate. 
The RBA can, of course, act in the domestic money market to replenish the 
banking system’s liquidity by buying securities. This cancels, or ‘sterilises’, the 
liquidity effect of the intervention and leaves domestic interest rates unchanged. 
This is called sterilised intervention, and is the routine practice for central banks, 
unless they specifically set out to achieve a change in monetary policy. By using its 
domestic operations to keep cash rates around a target level, the RBA offsets 
excess demand for, or supply of, cash in the banking system whether it arises from 
intervention or from any other source. 
At times of heavy intervention, this has the potential to cause substantial changes 
in the RBA’s balance sheet as, for example, it sells US dollars in the foreign 
exchange market and sterilises this by buying domestic securities. To avoid the 
costs that can arise from this, the RBA has moved in recent years to greater use of 
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foreign exchange swaps as the main vehicle for sterilising its intervention. In a 
situation where the RBA has bought Australian dollars and sold US dollars in its 
intervention operations, it subsequently undertakes a swap in which it lends 
Australian dollars and borrows US dollars. The settlement flows from the first leg 
of the swap offset those arising from the intervention transaction, and therefore 
remove the need for further operations to control liquidity. As each swap consists 
of a spot with an offsetting forward transaction, it does not alter the net balance of 
demand and supply for Australian dollars in the foreign exchange market, and 
therefore does not cancel out the effect on the exchange rate of the original 
intervention. 
4.  Intervention Since the Float 
Over the post-float period, there have been three broad cycles of foreign exchange 
intervention reflecting the three cycles in the exchange rate: one in the second half 
of the 1980s; one in the first half of the 1990s; and one since 1997 (Figure 1). Each 
cycle began with the Australian dollar falling and the RBA selling foreign 
exchange, with the position reversed during the second phase of the cycle as the 
exchange rate rose. 
The timing of each cycle shown in the graph is defined in terms of the major 
turning points in the RBA’s cumulative foreign exchange position resulting from 
intervention.2 For instance, the initial phase of the first cycle extended from 
December 1983 to September 1986 during which the RBA was a net seller of 
foreign exchange with cumulative net sales peaking at US$6.0 billion in September 
1986. From there through to September 1991, the RBA was a net buyer. Total 
purchases over that period amounted to US$11.7 billion, so that the cumulative 
position since the float moved from a net short position of US$6.0 billion in 
September 1986 to a net long position of US$5.7 billion in September 1991. The 
subsequent cycle saw net sales of foreign exchange between October 1991 and 
                                           
2  Changes in the RBA’s net foreign exchange position are measured as the net of transactions 
with the market, the Government, and all other counterparties. Foreign currency received as 
earnings on foreign assets has been included as a ‘purchase’ of foreign exchange. The RBA 
takes into account such earnings in calculating how much foreign exchange to buy in the 
market to cover sales to the Government. Earnings therefore influence the discretionary 
actions of the RBA. 
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October 1993, and net purchases from November 1993 to September 1997, while 
the final cycle saw net sales from October 1997 to February 2002 and net 
purchases from March 2002 onwards.3 
Figure 1: RBA Foreign Exchange Operations 
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3  The exact dates of the cycles are as follows: Cycle 1 – sales from 12 December 1983 to 
25 September 1986 and purchases from 26 September 1986 to 23 September 1991; Cycle 2 – 
sales from 24 September 1991 to 27 October 1993 and purchases from 28 October 1993 to 
2 September 1997; Cycle 3 – sales from 3 September 1997 to 7 February 2002 and purchases 
from 8 February 2002 to 30 June 2004. 
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As noted, the RBA’s approach to intervention has evolved over the past 20 years. 
In the early post-float period, the approach was characterised by the phrase ‘testing 
and smoothing’ and, reflecting this, transaction values were typically small and 
relatively frequent. This pattern of intervention continued through to 1986, when 
the sharp fall in the exchange rate resulted in intervention volumes being lifted 
significantly; about A$2 billion of intervention was undertaken over July and 
August 1986, with the largest amount done on a single day – over A$200 million – 
several times the previous maximum daily amount. 
From the early 1990s onwards, the RBA further changed its approach to 
intervention. There was no longer any semblance of ‘testing and smoothing’, but 
rather the focus was very clearly on attempting to limit large-scale overshooting of 
the exchange rate. As a result, there have been prolonged periods of no 
intervention, punctuated by short-lived episodes of heavy intervention when the 
exchange rate had moved to either very low or very high levels. 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics on the RBA’s foreign exchange 
transactions in the market, for the entire period since the float, and in each of the 
three cycles of intervention outlined earlier. 
Overall, in the 20 years since the float of the Australian dollar, the RBA has 
transacted with the market on 40 per cent of trading days. A large proportion of 
these transactions represent cover for Government business and, reflecting this, the 
RBA has transacted to purchase foreign exchange on about three times as many 
days as it has to sell foreign exchange. For the same reason, the average size of 
purchases is around half the average size of sales. Because of the change in the 
style of intervention after the 1980s, the figures for the latter period are quite 
different from those in the earlier period: 
•  the proportion of days on which the RBA intervened in the market declined 
after the 1980s. In the episode between 1983 and 1986, as the exchange rate 
fell, the RBA intervened in the market to buy Australian dollars on 
40 per cent of days. In the subsequent two episodes when the exchange rate 
fell, the RBA intervened in the market on only about 21 per cent and 
4 per cent of days, respectively; 
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•  the average transaction size increased. The size of average daily sales of 
foreign exchange to support the Australian dollar in the 1983 to 1986 episode 
was about A$20 million, but rose to around A$155 million in the subsequent 
two episodes; and 
•  the maximum size of daily intervention increased. For example, the largest 
daily sale of foreign exchange was equivalent to about A$250 million in the 
1980s episode, but about A$1  200 million in each of the subsequent two 
cycles.4 
Since the float in 1983, the net position resulting from sales and purchases of 
foreign exchange by the RBA (including transactions with the Australian 
Government) has fluctuated around zero. This provides an approximate indication 
that the RBA has not systematically tried to support or weaken the Australian 
dollar over the floating period as a whole. 
                                           
4  Note from Table 1 that in the second part of the first cycle the appreciation in the exchange 
rate was temporarily disrupted by the October 1987 stock market crash, with an ensuing bout 
of intervention and a maximum daily sale of foreign exchange of A$1 025 million. 
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5.  Profits from Intervention 
Formal evaluations of the efficacy of intervention are difficult to perform because 
it cannot be known how the exchange rate would have behaved in the absence of 
intervention. Furthermore, there is an endogeneity problem when estimating 
contemporaneous effects of intervention, since intervention is mostly triggered by 
exchange rate movements (Kearns and Rigobon 2003). 
Researchers have come up with indirect measures to evaluate whether intervention 
has exerted a stabilising influence on the exchange rate. One such measure is the 
‘profits test’ (Friedman 1953). The application of the profits test relies on the 
central bank acting as a stabilising long-term speculator. If the objective of the 
central bank is to limit the fluctuations in the exchange rate, this will tend to 
involve the purchase of the local currency (sale of foreign exchange) when the 
exchange rate is relatively low, and the sale of the local currency (purchase of 
foreign exchange) when the exchange rate is high. If the central bank is successful 
in buying low and selling high, its intervention should yield a profit. It follows 
from this that if a central bank has been profitable in its intervention, it must have 
bought low and sold high, therefore contributing to the stabilisation of the 
exchange rate. 
While we consider the behaviour of the RBA and the Australian dollar over the 
post-float period to be well suited to the application of the profit test, this does not 
imply that the approach will necessarily always be the most relevant in the 
evaluation of intervention. For example, one possible limitation in using trading 
profitability to gauge the effectiveness of intervention may arise when the 
exchange rate exhibits a persistent trend. In such cases the central bank may not 
have the opportunity to rebuild reserves at a higher exchange rate. Nonetheless, 
intervention may still have exerted a stabilising influence despite being 
unprofitable in a trading sense (although this is not the case for Australia over the 
post-float period). 
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As can be seen in Figure 2, the RBA has been successful in buying low and selling 
high in its interventions. The horizontal lines on the graph mark the average 
exchange rates at which total net transactions took place in each episode. These 
rates reflect the average exchange rate at which the RBA added to or subtracted 
from its overall foreign currency position by entering into deals in the market or 
with its clients. In the first cycle, the RBA bought Australian dollars (sold foreign 
exchange) at an average rate of US71.8 cents and subsequently sold Australian 
dollars (bought foreign exchange) at an average exchange rate of US76.9 cents. 
The respective figures in the second cycle were US72.0 cents and US77.8 cents; 
and in the third cycle they were US59.9 cents and US67.9 cents. Since in each 
cycle the RBA bought Australian dollars at a lower exchange rate than it 
subsequently sold them, the figures indicate that each cycle of intervention, and 
therefore intervention over the post-float period as a whole, has been profitable. 
Figure 2: Australian dollar and Average RBA Transaction Rates 
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In this study, we measure the profitability of intervention in the period from the 
float on 12 December 1983 to 30 June 2004. The profitability of the RBA’s 
operations in relation to its total foreign exchange position can be broken up into 
three main components as described below.5 
5.1  Realised Trading Profits 
Realised trading profits are those that accrue from trades that act to close out part 
of an existing open position.6 Realised gains or losses are measured by comparing 
the rate applicable to a transaction with the average rate at which the position was 
established. The calculation can be written as: 
  [ ] ∑
=
− = Π
t
i i s i e i m rp
t 1
 (1) 
where: 
∏
rp 
denotes realised trading profits; 
m is the reduction in an existing foreign currency position, with m>0 for sales of 
foreign currency in a long position, and m<0 for purchases of foreign currency 
in a short position; 
                                           
5  These three components of profitability were also identified in Andrew and Broadbent (1994), 
who found that over the period between 1983 and 1994, the RBA’s foreign exchange 
operations had been profitable and were thus judged to have exerted a stabilising influence on 
the exchange rate. 
6  Realised trading profits are calculated on the basis of economic gain in these examples. For 
financial reporting purposes the RBA accumulates foreign exchange on the basis of ‘average 
stock cost’ and accounts for gains and losses only when it sells this foreign exchange out of 
stock. There are two main differences between the concepts. Firstly, because for the purpose 
of this paper we are only concerned with events over the post-float period, gains arising from 
the average stock cost of foreign exchange reserves that had been acquired prior to the float of 
the Australian dollar are ignored. Secondly, the economic gain method used in the example 
implies that gains over the most recent episode have already been realised, whereas for 
financial reporting purposes they will not be realised until the RBA sells the foreign exchange 
acquired when replenishing reserves. 
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e is the exchange rate at which a transaction is made in terms of the number of 
Australian dollars per unit of foreign currency; and 
s is the weighted-average exchange rate at which the position is acquired. 
5.2  Unrealised Trading Profits 
As the name suggests, unrealised trading profits represent the gain or loss from 
marking any remaining open position to market at time t. The implied gains or 
losses result from comparing the prevailing market rate to the average rate of 
establishing the existing open position, and can be written as: 
  ( )( ) ∑
=
− − =
t
i
t s t e i m i v up
t Π
1
 (2) 
where: 
all notation is as previously explained; 
∏
up 
denotes unrealised trading profits; and 
v is the addition to an existing foreign currency position, with v>0 for purchases 
of foreign currency in a long position, and v<0 for sales of foreign currency in a 
short position. 
5.3  Net Interest Earnings 
The net interest earnings component of the profit calculation represents an attempt 
to capture the gain or loss in terms of interest income from switching between 
domestic and foreign assets which results from the central bank’s operations in the 
foreign exchange market. The impact on interest income arises because domestic 
and foreign interest rates are not normally the same. 
This component of profitability is particularly important if the exchange rate 
exhibits a longer-term trend that dominates the cycle. In this case the realised and 
unrealised trading profits alone may not be a reliable gauge in assessing the 
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effectiveness of intervention. For example, if the exchange rate were to exhibit 
trend depreciation this may prohibit the rebuilding of reserves at an exchange rate 
higher than at which they were spent. However, intervention may have contributed 
to the stabilisation of the exchange rate around the broader trend and could 
therefore be judged to have been successful, albeit unprofitable. The inclusion of 
net interest earnings in this example would add to profitability as long as there is a 
long term tendency toward uncovered interest parity, which would imply that 
interest rates in the economy whose exchange rate is depreciating are on average 
higher than abroad.7 
The addition to profits from net interest earnings can be written as: 
   (3)  ∑
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*
where: 
all notation is as previously explained; 
∏
ni 
denotes net interest earnings; and 
r and r* are the short-term interest rates on Australian dollar and foreign 
currency assets, respectively. 
5.4  Methodologies of calculating profits 
The majority of foreign exchange reserves until the early 1990s were held in US 
dollars. With the shift to a diversified reserves portfolio in mid 1991, while 
intervention was still exclusively conducted in Australian dollars against the US 
dollar, it has been followed by transactions in the European euro (previously the 
Deutschemark) and the Japanese yen against the US dollar to rebalance the reserve 
                                           
7  For a more in-depth discussion of the rationale behind including net interest earnings in the 
calculation of profits, see Andrew and Broadbent (1994). 
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portfolio.8 As such, sales or purchases of Australian dollars were in effect 
conducted against the three major world currencies, not just the US dollar. One 
could therefore argue that the measure of profitability of intervention should take 
into account not only the exchange rate between the Australian dollar and the US 
dollar, but also that between the Australian dollar and other currencies in official 
reserves. Although it is important to note that explicit intervention transactions 
against the US dollar are quite distinct in the timing of their execution to the 
subsequent reserve rebalancing transactions. 
In the estimates below, we present two profit calculations: one which is based 
purely on the first leg of intervention – i.e. transactions in the Australian dollar 
against the US dollar which we refer to as the ‘US dollar Intervention’ method; and 
one which also takes into account the related rebalancing transactions which we 
call the ‘Reserve Impact’ method.9 
5.4.1  US dollar Intervention Method (UIM) 
To calculate profits using the UIM, all transactions are treated as having occurred 
in US dollars against the Australian dollar. While this is the case for the bulk of 
transactions in the market and with clients, some transactions are conducted 
against a third currency, and for these the appropriate cross-rate is applied. 
Similarly, earnings on reserves are all converted into US dollar terms despite 
having also been earned in euro and yen. 
                                           
8  Prior to the formal adoption of a diversified portfolio, the RBA held its foreign exchange 
reserves mainly in US dollars. While there were always assets denominated in other 
currencies, there was no systematic rebalancing. In the middle of 1991 the policy of managing 
reserves changed to formally hold 40 per cent of reserves in US dollars and 30 per cent each 
in Deutschemark (later euro) and Japanese yen. Rebalancing transactions took place from 
time to time to approximate these weights. However, active management of reserves meant 
that there were prolonged periods during which the actual portfolio composition departed 
from the prescribed weightings. In early 2000 the RBA adopted a more passive management 
policy where rebalancing transactions were conducted on a daily basis with a tolerance for a 
1 per cent deviation from the allocation. A further change occurred in early 2002 when the 
RBA modified the benchmark weights to 45 per cent US dollars, 45 per cent euro, and 
10 per cent yen. 
9  Andrew and Broadbent (1994) presented profit estimates based only on the ‘US dollar 
Intervention’ method as for most of the period they covered in their study, reserves were held 
primarily in US dollars. 
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Total profits are simply the sum of realised and unrealised trading profits plus net 
interest earnings over the period, that arise from changes in the overall foreign 
currency position as a result of transactions and earnings as described above. 
Table 2 details the composition of profits over the post-float period as a whole and 
during the three cycles explained earlier. 
Table 2 shows that the RBA’s foreign exchange market transactions have been 
profitable over the 20 years since the float, with realised profits of $3.7 billion, 
unrealised profits of $0.5 billion, and additional interest earnings of $1.6 billion. 
Note also that each cycle has been profitable regardless of whether net interest 
earnings are taken into consideration. This may be interpreted as intervention 
having exerted a stabilising influence on the exchange rate. 
Table 2: Profits From Intervention (UIM) 
A$ million 
 Realised  Unrealised  Interest  Total 
Since the float
(a)  3 707    510  1 634  5 851 
Cycle 1
(b)   405  –122   354   637 
Cycle 2
(c)  1 146    –82  1 345  2 410 
Cycle 3
(d)  1 831    182  1 087  3 101 
Notes:  (a) 12 December 1983 to 30 June 2004. The sum of profits in each of the cycles is not the same as profits 
over the entire post-float period as each cycle is treated independently. This requires that the 
cumulative foreign exchange position be reset to zero at the beginning of each cycle, irrespective of 
the remaining open position that is the result of operations from the preceding cycle. The average
exchange rate of transactions within each cycle is therefore entirely determined by operations
undertaken within that cycle. 
  (b) 12 December 1983 to 23 September 1991. 
  (c) 24 September 1991 to 2 September 1997. 
  (d) 3 September 1997 to 30 June 2004. 
 
5.4.2  Reserve Impact Method (RIM) 
Under this methodology, a decision to intervene is effectively treated as a decision 
to intervene in the Australian dollar against all three reserve currencies 
simultaneously (i.e. US dollar, European euro, and Japanese yen). Daily 
transactions are split into the three reserve currencies according to their respective 
   19
portfolio weightings.10 Apart from this, the methodology is the same as that used in 
the UIM above.11 
Table 3 shows the profitability of intervention under the RIM method. 
Table 3: Profits From Intervention (RIM) 
A$million 
 Realised  Unrealised  Interest  Total 
Since the float
(a)  2 515    318  2 385  5 218 
Cycle 1
(b)   405  –122    354   637 
Cycle 2
(c)    680    195  1 612  2 487 
Cycle 3
(d)    761    96  1 776  2 634 
Notes:  (a) 12 December 1983 to 30 June 2004. Profits over the cycles will not add to profits since the float. 
  (b) 12 December 1983 to 23 September 1991; USD 100 per cent, DEM 0 per cent, JPY 0 per cent. 
  (c) 24 September 1991 to 2 September 1997; USD 40 per cent, DEM 30 per cent, JPY 30 per cent. 
  (d) 3 September 1997 to 30 June 2004; before February 2002 USD 40 per cent, DEM (EUR) 30 per cent, 
JPY 30 per cent; from February 2002 USD 45 per cent, EUR 45 per cent, JPY 10 per cent. 
 
On this method, total profits from intervention over the floating period to 
30 June 2004 are slightly smaller than on the UIM method, at A$5.2 billion. This 
comprised A$2.5 billion in realised profits, A$0.3 billion in unrealised profits, and 
A$2.4 billion in interest earnings. Again, intervention in each of the three cycles in 
the exchange rate has also been profitable. Taking portfolio rebalancing 
                                           
10 Transactions with clients in the Australian dollar that are not directly dealt against the US 
dollar are initially converted into US dollar terms at the appropriate exchange rate before the 
portfolio weightings are applied. Once the daily sum of transactions is split into three parts, 
each part is then converted into reserve currency terms using the daily 4pm AEST exchange 
rate. 
11 Realised profits are calculated from any trade that acts in the direction of closing out the 
RBA’s position in any one of the three foreign currencies. Unrealised profits are calculated 
from the RBA’s open position, using the average exchange rate of obtaining each position and 
the currently prevailing exchange rate of the Australian dollar against the US dollar, euro, and 
yen. Interest earned or foregone by the RBA as a result of shifting between domestic and 
foreign assets reflects the differential between domestic and overseas interest rates. The net 
interest earnings for the US portfolio are calculated on the interest differential between 
Australian 13-week Treasury notes and the 3-month US Treasury bill. Net interest earnings 
for Japan (Europe) are calculated by applying the interest differential against the Japanese 
3-month government bill (3-month Euribor) to the RBA’s net open yen (euro/Deutschemark) 
position. 
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transactions into consideration when calculating profitability, therefore does not 
materially impact on the interpretation of the results. 
Figure 3 shows the pattern of profits through each of the three cycles, using the 
RIM. As can be seen, intervention is initially unprofitable as the RBA starts to 
intervene before the trough in the exchange rate has been reached, consistent with 
its objective of trying to stabilise the exchange rate. It also indicates that early 
rounds of intervention do not produce a permanent change in the path of the 
exchange rate. 
We interpret the overall findings from this study as evidence that intervention over 
the post-float period has, on balance, worked to stabilise the exchange rate. The 
results are also in line with similar studies in other major countries. Other methods 
used to assess the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention have relied on 
event studies and even surveys of foreign exchange dealers. Appendix A provides 
a literature survey of the main findings of these studies. 
Figure 3: Cumulative Profits From Intervention 
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6.  Conclusion 
The exchange rate regime in place in Australia over the past two decades can be 
best characterised as an independent float with occasional intervention by the 
RBA. Our study has found that the RBA has earned significant profits from its 
intervention over the past two decades, indicating that its foreign exchange 
operations have been to purchase the local currency when it is low and sell it when 
it is high, thereby exerting a stabilising influence. This conclusion is strengthened 
by the finding that the RBA’s foreign exchange operations have also been 
profitable in each of the three identifiable cycles in the exchange rate.   22
Appendix A: Effectiveness of Australian Intervention – A Survey 
Many authors have attempted to measure the effectiveness of foreign exchange 
intervention by central banks. Edison (1993) conducts a thorough survey of the 
early international literature. Sarno and Taylor (2001) discuss the progress made 
over the 1990s in international studies of the efficacy of intervention. 
Edison, Cashin and Liang (2003, p 12) note a ‘general consensus in the literature’ 
that intervention via influencing market participants’ portfolio decisions is 
ineffective, but that there is some evidence that intervention via the signalling 
channel is effective. Sarno and Taylor (2001) view the evidence from the 1990s as 
supportive of the effectiveness of intervention via both channels. Sarno and Taylor 
also suggest a third channel of intervention that may be relevant; the coordination 
channel.12 
A considerable literature has developed that studies the effectiveness of the 
intervention activities of the RBA. This survey outlines the methods used and 
empirical results found in this literature.13 
A1.  Evaluating the Effectiveness of Intervention 
Measuring the effectiveness of intervention is difficult for two reasons. Mainly this 
is because the counterfactual is unknown. That is to say, it cannot be reliably 
estimated how the exchange rate would have behaved in the absence of 
intervention.14 In addition, there is endogeneity between intervention and exchange 
rate movements; intervention will affect the exchange rate and the exchange rate is 
also an input into any decision to intervene. It is difficult to control for this, and in 
                                           
12 The authors suggest that the central bank has a role to remedy coordination failures in the 
foreign exchange market when the exchange rate is overvalued or experiencing a bubble, but 
where traders are unwilling to be the first to break the trend. The central bank could use 
publicly announced intervention operations to coordinate ‘smart money’ traders to enter the 
market together and break the bubble (Sarno and Taylor 2001, p 863). 
13  For background information on the RBA’s foreign exchange operations, refer also to 
Fraser (1992), Macfarlane (1993, 1998) and Rankin (1998). 
14 Sarno and Taylor (2001) refer to studies by Dominguez and Frankel in which exchange rate 
expectations are used to proxy for the counterfactual. However, to our knowledge no studies 
of this sort have been carried out in the Australian context. 
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attempts to mitigate the problem, some studies have excluded the contemporaneous 
effect of intervention on the exchange rate, leading to possibly biased results. 
Many attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of intervention that have failed to 
capture the endogeneity have been unsuccessful. 
Nonetheless, five main methods have been used in the literature in attempts to 
measure the effectiveness of intervention. These are: 
•  event studies; 
•  time series studies; 
•  measuring the profits from intervention; 
•  Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM); and 
•  survey methods. 
A1.1 Event  Studies 
Event studies identify distinct intervention episodes and examine the effectiveness 
of intervention within the intervention window. Intervention is judged to be 
effective if it ‘has been successful at stopping or delaying any given trend in the 
exchange rate’ (Edison et al 2003, p 12). Fatum (2000) observes that ‘standard 
time-series techniques may not be well suited when dealing with the analysis of 
intervention vis-à-vis the behaviour of exchange rates’, whereas the event study 
method ‘seems to fit well’ given that ‘a cluster of intervention operations 
constitutes a natural candidate for identification as a single event’ (Fatum 2000, 
pp 5–6). In addition, examining intervention windows can also allow the use of 
intraday data on exchange rates if these data are available. 
Edison et al (2003) undertook an event study of the RBA’s intervention in the 
Australian dollar. The authors found 18 episodes of intervention between 1984 and 
December 2001 with 12 out of 18 episodes classified as successful. They conclude 
that there is some evidence that the ‘RBA has been effectively “leaning against the 
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wind” in changing the trend movement in the Australian dollar exchange rate’ 
(Edison et al 2003, p 17). 
The method of classification employed in event studies is often somewhat 
inflexible. An episode of intervention is classified as successful if the intervention 
immediately reverses the trend observed in the exchange rate prior to the 
intervention, or if it achieves a continued reversal of the trend, or both. However, 
the method does not take account of the purpose of the intervention. 
In Edison et al’s study, this inflexibility leads to two possible misclassifications of 
intervention episodes. Intervention in December 2000 is classified as a failure 
because it does not reverse the direction of the trend in the exchange rate. The 
authors note that it could also be classified as leaning with the wind: the RBA 
purchased Australian dollars at a time when the Australian dollar was appreciating 
(from a low level) and that appreciation continued following the intervention. That 
is, the RBA leaned with the wind successfully. Intervention in January 2001 is a 
second possible misclassification. Here, the RBA again purchased Australian 
dollars at a time when the Australian dollar was appreciating, a possible attempt to 
lean with the wind, but the currency depreciated over the intervention window and 
following the intervention. Because the exchange rate firstly appreciated and then 
depreciated, the intervention was classified as successful. However, as the RBA 
aimed to support the currency and this was not the result, using this methodology 
the episode should not be classified as a success.15 
A1.2  Time Series Studies 
Various time series studies have also been conducted to evaluate intervention. 
Many of these have failed to find strong evidence to suggest that intervention is 
effective. This is most often due to the fact that these models do not capture the 
endogeneity between intervention and the exchange rate, or have excluded 
the problem of endogeneity by excluding contemporaneous intervention 
preventing ‘measurement of the immediate impact [of intervention]’ (Kearns and 
Rigobon 2003, p 5). 
                                           
15 These reclassifications would not have altered the conclusions of the study as 12 out of 18 
intervention episodes would still be classified as successful. 
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Consequently, the results produced in these models are likely to su f fe r from  a 
negative bias which results in small and insignificant or incorrectly signed 
estimates for the impact of intervention. That is, the models predict that a purchase 
of the domestic currency has little effect on the currency or even depreciates the 
currency. Other coefficient estimates may also be biased due to the omitted 
variables. Kearns and Rigobon (2003) discuss the effects of the exclusions and 
provide an empirical example of the effect of ignoring the contemporaneous effects 
of central bank intervention. 
Despite the difficulties faced, time series studies have been undertaken to address 
the important question of the efficacy of foreign exchange intervention. Various 
methods have been used and some of those employed in the Australian context are 
considered here. 
A1.2.1  Results from GARCH time series modelling  
Many of the time series studies use models of the exchange rate with GARCH or 
EGARCH (exponential generalised autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic) 
error structures. These models ‘allow the empirical testing of the effectiveness of 
intervention to be carried out simultaneously on both the mean and conditional 
volatility of exchange rate returns’ (Kim, Kortian and Sheen 1999, p 10). Testing 
the effects of intervention on the conditional mean of the exchange rate is one way 
to test if the intervention has had the effect of reversing or dampening a trend in 
the exchange rate. 
Kim et al (1999) employ an EGARCH model to explain the percentage change in 
the A$/US$ exchange rate with intervention included as one of the explanatory 
variables. They use daily data from December 1983 to December 1997 and break 
the sample up into smaller sub-periods according to variations in the intervention 
style employed by the RBA. The authors find that the estimated contemporaneous 
effects of intervention were destabilising. However, the authors note that this is 
likely the result of the simultaneity of intervention and the exchange rate. When 
the slope dummy variables are examined they find ‘evidence of a stabilising 
influence on the $A/$US exchange rate process’ due to the RBA’s intervention and 
that ‘a worse outcome on [the day of intervention] may have occurred if the 
Reserve Bank had not intervened’ (p 16). 
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A1.2.2  Results from Central Bank Reaction Function Studies 
Other time series studies (Rogers and Siklos 2003, McKenzie 2004 and Kim and 
Sheen 2002) use a central bank reaction function to investigate the conditions 
under which the central bank may intervene. Identifying what prompts a central 
bank to intervene can provide evidence as to whether the central bank is acting to 
‘lean against the wind’. These studies most often use a Probit model to predict the 
probability of intervention given movements and volatility in the exchange rate. 
Rogers and Siklos (2003) study the intervention of the RBA using daily data for 
the period of January 1989 to September 1998. They find ‘considerable evidence’ 
of ‘leaning against the wind’ throughout the 1989–1997 period and intervention 
was ‘quantitatively larger’ in the 1989–1993 period.16 In addition, as would be 
expected, the stabilising effects of intervention are greatest on the day of 
intervention and decrease gradually on the days following the intervention. 
Kim and Sheen (2002) use data from December 1983 to December 1997 ‘to 
estimate Probit models for purchases and sales of foreign currency (in US$) 
separately’ and also to ‘estimate a friction model of intervention whereby the 
Reserve Bank chooses to buy/sell only beyond threshold limits’ (p  627). The 
authors find in general ‘that a moderate appreciation (depreciation) of the $A from 
its 150–day average leads to an intervention purchase (sale) of foreign currency 
designed to slow the rise (fall) of the value of the $A’ (p  647). This form of 
intervention is ‘in accordance with the stated short horizon aim of leaning against 
the wind’. In addition, the friction model reveals that ‘intervention is strongly 
correlated with lagged intervention, which suggests that positive (negative) 
intervention was usually followed by positive (negative) intervention on the 
following day’ (p 643). Kim and Sheen suggest that this persistence may imply 
that RBA intervention tends to be carried out over a few days and they propose that 
this may improve its effectiveness as their model gives a significant estimate for 
the stabilising effect of cumulative intervention. 
                                           
16 Despite noting the possibility of simultaneity between their chosen estimation equations, due 
to the endogeneity of exchange rates and intervention, the authors estimate equations 
separately on the basis of Hausman specification tests. However, if simultaneity was in fact a 
problem, the estimates may be biased. 
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McKenzie (2004) conducts analysis using a Probit analysis of the reaction 
function; an ‘ex post government intervention decision against a measure of 
exchange rate volatility’ (p 62). In addition, he proxies for exchange rate volatility 
using a GARCH model. McKenzie finds that the ‘dynamics of the foreign 
exchange market are significantly different on the days’ on which the RBA 
intervenes (p 72). He notes that it could be that RBA intervenes on these days 
because volatility in the market is high, or it may be that volatility is high because 
the RBA intervenes. However, distinguishing between these is not possible within 
his analysis due to the likely endogeneity of intervention and the exchange rate. 
A1.2.3  Other time series approaches 
Hopkins and Murphy (1997) undertake a case study using regression analysis to 
determine the effect of intervention on the market. They examine the 7.5 per cent 
depreciation of the Australian dollar during July to October 1993 and aim to 
identify the relative importance of information in the market at that time when 
‘uncertainty regarding the passage of the Federal Budget through the Senate was 
reflected in the foreign exchange market’ (p 199). They find, for this period of 
uncertainty in the market, that ‘intervention operations and associated statements 
by the RBA did provide some stability to the market’ (p  217). However, their 
results should be interpreted with caution as only a small sample size is used due to 
the restricted time period studied, and as the authors include contemporaneous 
intervention but ignore the possible simultaneity issues that arise as a result. 
Karunaratne (1996) employs multicointegration techniques to test the hypothesis 
that RBA intervention has been ineffective. The author breaks up the period from 
December 1983 to May 1993 into five sub-periods and models the rationale for 
RBA intervention using a quadratic loss function where the RBA aims to minimise 
‘losses due to target missing and losses because of exchange rate instability’ 
(p 409). The results of the Johansen multicointegration tests are ‘favourable to the 
proposition that RBA intervention was effective from a long-run perspective’ 
(p 415). However, the methods used do not take account of the endogeneity of the 
exchange rate and intervention. Consequently, as Karunaratne notes, the long-run 
equilibrium relationships found between the nominal exchange rate, the foreign 
interest rate as a proxy for the unobservable target exchange rate target variable, 
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and the domestic interest rate (with net purchases of foreign currency included as a 
control variable), may ‘have occurred even without intervention’ (p 415). 
A1.3  Profits from Intervention 
The thinking underlying this line of research was outlined in the body of this paper. 
As noted, it is an adaptation of the argument put by Friedman (1953) that 
stabilising speculation should be profitable. Until now, Andrew and 
Broadbent (1994) had been the only Australian study to conduct an analysis of the 
profits from intervention. They find significant profits from intervention between 
December 1983 and June 1994 and conclude that RBA intervention had a 
stabilising influence on the Australian dollar exchange rate against the US dollar. 
A1.4  Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) Studies  
There has been a recent innovation in the study of intervention developed by 
Kearns and Rigobon (2003). The authors use simulated Generalised Method of 
Moments to evaluate the effectiveness of intervention while explicitly allowing for 
the endogeneity of the intervention and the exchange rate. 
Kearns and Rigobon (2003, p 1) recognise that ‘once a central bank has decided to 
intervene, the quantity of currency it buys or sells and the decision as to whether to 
engage in further intervention will typically depend on the response of the 
exchange rate to [the central bank’s] trades’. The advantage of GMM is that the 
model allows estimation of a set of simultaneous equations and explicitly captures 
the interdependence of the exchange rate and the central bank’s intervention and 
the contemporaneous impact of intervention. 
Their results provide empirical econometric evidence to support the description of 
RBA intervention as ‘leaning against the wind’. The results of the paper suggest 
that there is a strong positive effect of intervention (where Australian dollars are 
purchased and foreign exchange sold); particularly on the day it is conducted, with 
a smaller positive effect for a few days afterwards.17 They find point estimates to 
                                           
17 This result is consistent with the findings of other studies where significant effects are not 
found if the contemporaneous effects of the intervention are excluded as these studies only 
pick up the smaller effects on subsequent days. 
   29
suggest that RBA intervention has an economically and statistically significant 
contemporaneous effect on the exchange rate, such that a US$100 million purchase 
of Australian dollars will appreciate the Australian dollar by between 1.3 per cent 
and 1.8 per cent. 
A1.5 Survey  Methods 
One other method that has been applied to gauge the effectiveness of RBA 
intervention is to survey market participants. Hutcheson (2003) surveyed foreign 
exchange dealers licensed by the RBA as at 12 July 1999.18 The tabulated 
responses imply that the RBA’s intervention transactions and their motivations are 
viewed as credible, with 86  per  cent of respondents stating that intervention is 
usually conducted at the appropriate moment, 77 per cent saying that intervention 
achieves the desired goals and 73  per  cent answering that intervention moves 
exchange rates towards their fundamental value. Fifty per cent of respondents 
thought that intervention increases exchange rate volatility. However, this result 
should be interpreted with caution. If the exchange rate falls intraday and 
intervention successfully reverses the depreciation, intraday volatility will have 
increased due to the intervention. Alternatively, as Hutcheson suggests, intraday 
volatility may increase if intervention is not well anticipated by dealers. In 
addition, this result is difficult to interpret as no time frame for volatility was stated 
in the survey question. 
                                           
18 Fifty-nine surveys were sent to foreign exchange dealers and 39 of these were completed. The 
respondents were mostly senior employees in their institutions’ treasury departments. 
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